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Case Comment
IN RE LYSAGHT: HILL V. THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, [1965]
3 W.L.R. 391 (Ch. D.)-CHARITABLE TRUST-RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION-TRUSTEE'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT TRUST-PUBLIC POLICY--CYPRES.-In an age when dicrimination has become a dirty word and
when charitable foundations, educational institutions and other
objects of private philanthropy are increasingly conscious of the need
for good public relations, it is only to be expected that a charitable
gift which is expressly made unavailable to adherents to particular
religious faiths should cause acute embarrassment to its recipient.
This was precisely the problem which arose in the recent English
case of In re Lysagkt: Hill v. The Royal College of Surgeons.'
By clause 11 of her will, the testatrix, having recited that "it
has long been my wish to found certain medical studentships to be
placed within the gift of ...

the Royal College of Surgeons of

England", directed that the sum of £5,000 should be paid to the
College which should hold it as an endowment fund and use the
income to establish one or more studentships to enable students to
prosecute medical or surgical careers. Paragraph (D) of clause 11
provided that to be eligible for such a studentship, a student should
be "of the male sex and . . . a British born subject and not of the

Jewish or Roman Catholic faith". The College informed the trustees
that it could not accept the gift on the terms in which it was given
because the exclusion of Jews and Roman Catholics was "so invidious
and alien to the spirit of the College's work as to make the gift
inoperable in its present form". On the other hand, if the offending
paragraph (D) could be deleted, the College would have been most
happy to accept the gift. The trustees subsequently took out a
summons asking (a) whether the trust declared in clause 11 was
a valid charitable trust; (b) if so, whether the money should be paid
to the College on the footing that the discriminatory provisions were
invalid or whether the fund ought to be applied cy pres and (c) if
necessary, that a scheme might be established for the application of
the fund.
Buckley J. first canvassed the question whether the testatrix
had manifested a general charitable intention 2 and concluded, after
1 [1965] 3 W.L.R. 391 (Ch.D.).
2 'General charitable intention' was defined as "a paramount intention
to effect some charitable purpose which the court can find a method
of putting into operation, notwithstanding that it is impracticable to give
effect to some direction by the donor which is not an essential part of his
*

.

. paramount intention". This was contrasted with a 'particular charitable

intention' which was said to exist "where the donor means his charitable
disposition to take effect if, but only if, it can be carried into effect in a
particular specified way". Supra, footnote 1, at p. 399.
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a consideration of the provisions of clause 11 of the will, that the
paramount intention of the testatrix was to establish the studentships within the gift of the College; although the identity of the
trustee (the College) was an essential element in her true intention,
the provisions contained in paragraph (D) were not. Therefore, although the provisions of paragraph (D) should be complied with
so long as such compliance was consistent with giving effect to the
paramount intention of the testatrix, they should not be insisted
upon if such insistence would jeopardize the implementation of the
paramount intention.
The next question therefore was whether there could be compliance with the provisions contained in paragraph (D). There were
two grounds on which they might be struck down as invalid: either
that they were too uncertain or that they were contrary to public
policy.
On the question of the uncertainty of the expression "of the
Jewish or Roman Catholic faith", Buckley J. discussed and distinguished Clayton v. Ramden.3 In that case there was attached to a
gift a condition subsequent which provided for forfeiture of the gift
if the recipient should marry a person not of Jewish parentage and
of the Jewish faith. Buckley J., relying on In re Allen,4 was able to
distinguish Clayton v. Ramsden on the ground that whereas in a
case involving forfeiture it was essential that all the circumstances
of the event giving rise to the forfeiture be definable with a high
degree of precision, it was otherwise where the question was one
of qualification for a benefit. Although it might be difficult for a
particular individual to say with absolute certainty that he satisfied
the test of paragraph (D) there would always be those of whom it
could be said that they certainly satisfied the requirement.
The learned judge dismissed quite summarily the suggestion that
the religious discrimination of paragraph (D) was contrary to public
policy. He accepted that racial and religious discrimination was
widely regarded as deplorable and was prepared to describe the
testatrix' exclusion of Jews and Roman Catholics as "unamiable"
and "undesirable" but considered that that fell very far short of
saying it was contrary to public policy.
It remained to determine whether there was any other ground
on which the trust might be saved. It was at this point that Buckley
J.'s earlier definition of the paramount intention of the testatrix
became important. It was an essential part of that intention that
the College should be the trustee; it followed that if the College
refused to act the trust would fail; but the College refused to act
solely on the ground that it found the discriminatory provisions of
paragraph (D) unacceptable. Since those provisions had been found
not to be part of the paramount intention of the testatrix, they
3
4

[1943] A.C. 320.
[19531 Ch. 810 (C.A.).
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could and must be discarded because to insist upon compliance with
them would be to defeat the trust. Thus, in the result, Buckley J.
concluded that the court should do what was necessary to enable
the trust to be carried into effect, and a scheme was ordered whereby
the endowment fund was to be paid to the College to be held on the
trusts declared in clause 11, omitting the words "and not of the
Jewish or Roman Catholic faith" in paragraph (D).
It is submitted that inasmuch as the court was prepared in In
re Lysaght 5 to excise the offensively discriminatory provisions, the
result is a good one. What is not so clear, on the basis of the reasoning of the case, is whether the courts are or should be prepared to
set their faces against such provisions in all allegedly charitable
trusts. Even if the courts are prepared to adopt such a stance, it
is by no means certain that In re Lysaght 6 provides reliable machinery for the performance of the necessary surgery in all cases.
The question which must be asked is whether racial or religious
discrimination has any place in the law relating to charitable trusts.
This, of course, is to frame the issue too widely since it is clear that
a charitable trust is not to be regarded as objectionable simply
because its benefits are limited to a section of the community which
is defined by reference to a common racial, religious or national
characteristic; a distinction must be drawn between objectionable
and unobjectionable discrimination. For example, it could hardly be
said that a gift to provide religious, educational or recreational
facilities for the members of a church was objectionably discriminatory, although it is clear that eligibility for enjoyment of the benefits
of the gift would depend upon a particular religious affiliation. Again,
the gift of a fund to provide scholarships at a law school for students
who were members of the Jehovah's Witnesses would, in a literal
sense, be discriminatory but would probably not be regarded as
objectionable in the light of the past history of civil liberties litigation carried on by and on behalf of the members of that sect. In
other words, discrimination which is aimed at advancing the legitimate interests of a particular group should not attract the wrath
of the moralist, the indignation of the civil libertarian or the surgical attention of the court.
Perhaps the kind.of discrimination with which the courts should
be concerned can be defined no more precisely than "malicious discrimination". Clearly, there is all the difference in the world between
a gift to the University of Mississippi for the provision of scholarship
aid to negro students and one for the provision of scholarships at
the same University for white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant students, but
the distinction may be incapable of precise formulation. It may be
that all one can do is ask the question, "In the light of all the social
circumstances and of all the purposes to be achieved, is the discriminatory element in this charitable trust designed to perpetuate prejudice?"
5 Supra, footnote 1.
6 Ibid.
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Two further points should be made: first, whether a particular
provision is objectionable or acceptable is not to be determined
simply by whether it is framed to include or to exclude. A gift,
the beneficiaries of which are "anyone except Jews, Roman Catholics
and Negroes" may be neither more nor less malicious and objectionable than one "for white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants".
Second, the character of a discriminatory provision is not simply
a question of the provision being, directed in favour of or against a
minority group. An attempt to discern the intention of a donor and
the effect of a provision must go beyond such superficial considerations. It is suggested, for example, that there would be nothing reprehensible about a trust to provide scholarships to enable EnglishCanadian residents of Ontario to study at French-speaking universities in Quebec.
Even assuming, however, that some satisfactory formula could
be arrived at for isolating the kind of discrimination which is widely
regarded as deplorable, the question still remains whether the courts
should be prepared to countenance such discrimination in charitable
trusts. It is submitted that they should not. The notion that an
individual should be free to dispose of his property as he chooses is
no doubt deeply entrenched and strenuously supported and while it
is true that society has from time to time set its face against practices in the public domain which draw invidious distinctions between
people on such bases as race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry and
place of origin, there has generally been a reluctance to make any
inroads on the right of the individual to use his private property for
private purposes 7 in any way he chooses. Thus, in his private use
of his private property, the individual is free to harbour such prejudices and discriminatory feelings as he chooses and he may conduct
his private life so as to manifest to the full those prejudices and
feelings. But as his activities enter the public domain so he may
expect to encounter less permissive attitudes on the part of society.8
At first glance private philanthropy carried on through the establishment of charitable trusts is merely an individual's private dealings
with his private property; it should therefore be open to that individual to select the beneficiaries of his bounty in whatever way,
and on whatever basis he chooses.
It is suggested, however, that such an argument overlooks the
essential point that charitable trusts are public trusts and that when
7 The Ontario Human Rights Code, S.O. 1961-62, c. 93 is limited in its
application to such activities as employment practices, apartment leasing and
the provision of accommodation, services or facilities in any place to which
the public is customarily admitted. Although these provisions impinge in some
cases upon the use by an owner of his private property, they only do so to the
extent that the property has been made available, with or without a charge,
to the public at large.
8 See per Black J. in Mars. v. Alabama (1946), 326 U.S. 501, at p. 506:
"The more an owner ... opens up his property for use by the public in
general the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it."
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a donor creates a charitable trust, he gives his property into the
public domain, for the public good. Society is totally involved in
the charitable trust and without that involvement, such a trust
would be utterly ineffective. The most obvious manifestation of
society's concern for and involvement in charitable trusts is, of
course, their freedom from taxation. A gift to a charitable organization or to charitable purposes is not subject to gift tax 9 and the
value of the gift may be deducted from the aggregate net value in
computing the aggregate taxable value of property passing on death; 10
No succession duty is levied under the Ontario legislation on dispositions for charitable purposes;" and the income of a charitable trust
12
or organization is not subject to taxation.
Taxation, however, is only one manifestation of society's interest
in charitable trusts. Others may be enumerated; such a trust is
granted the right to exist perpetually and is not subject to the rule
against perpetuities; 13 it may be revitalized and modernized by the
application of the doctrine of cy pres; it is given its original vitality
and becomes operative only after a court has found, either specifically
or by inference that it is charitable; it is overseen and enforced by
14
an officer of the state.
It can hardly be contended in the light of all these considerations
that the settlor of a charitable trust is dealing with private property
in a private way. Surely the society which grants the immunities
and benefits cannot be precluded from having some say as to the
kind of scheme which is to qualify for such a favour. This suggestion
was incorporated into the Report of the English Committee on the
Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts in these words:
the public should not be compelled to take whatever is offered to it, but
should ... have the right of considering whether that particular use
which the Founder has fancied shall take effect, or whether the property
shall be turned to some other public use, or given back to private uses
. A certain deference should be paid to the donor's wishes, . . . but
they should never be allowed to interfere with the public welfare. 15
It is submitted, therefore, that the courts do have the right to
examine closely the provisions of charitable trusts and that their
9 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, Part IV as amended, s. 112(4) (c).
10 Estate Tax Act, S.C. 1958, c. 29, s. 7(1) (d) (i) as amended S.C. 1960,
c. 29, s. 4(1), S.C. 1962 (2d session), c. 5, s. 2(1).
11 The Succession Duty Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 386, s. 5, as amended S.0. 196061, c. 95, s. 1; S.O., 1965, c. 126, s. 3.
12 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 62(1) (e), (g).
13 Or, more properly, the rule against trusts which last too long or the
rule against remoteness of vesting. See Morris and Leach, The Rule Against
Perpetuities (2d. ed. London. 1962), ch. 7. See also Goodman v. Mayor of
SaZtaslh (1882), 7 App. Cas. 633, at p. 642.
14 In the United Kingdom this officer is the Attorney-General. In Ontario
he is the Public Trustee.
15 Great Britain: Committee on the Law and Practice relating to
Charitable trusts: Report 1952. Cmd. 8710. Para. 95. The passage reproduced
was quoted by the Committee from Hobhouse, The Dead Hand: Addresses
on the Subject of Endowments and Settlements of Property, 1880. At this
point in the Report, the Committee was considering extensions to the cy pres
doctrine.
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consideration should not be limited to a determination of whether
the particular scheme falls within the legal definition of charity but
might legitimately include the question whether all the provisions
of the trust should be allowed to take effect.
It remains to ask on what basis malicious discrimination in an
allegedly charitable trust is to be attacked. It was suggested, supra,
that the approach taken in In re .- rsaght16 is not reliable since it
depends for its effectiveness on (a) the court's being able to find
that the discriminatory provisions are not part of the settlor's paramount intention and (b) the trustee's being unwilling to accept the
trust in a situation where the identity of the trustee is of the essence.
It is submitted that the first of these factors may be relevant in a
slightly different context, as will be shown later in this note. The
trustee's willingness or unwillingness to act, however, should not be
crucial in determining whether the court should examine the discriminatory provisions. If that is to be the criterion, any settlor
could ensure that his personal prejudices might be perpetuated under
the benevolent aegis of the State, by the simple expedient of carefully selecting trustees of like mind as himself.
It is submitted, however, that there are two perfectly proper
bases from which an attack may be launched against maliciously
discriminatory provisions in charitable trusts.
The first of these is that malicious discrimination is the very
antithesis of public benefit which is an essential element of all
varieties of legal charity. The Report of the Committee on the Law
and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts contains the following
remarks which appear in the Committee's discussion of the Statute
of Charitable Uses: 17
the Statute made history by providing a much needed "definition" of
charity, and a definition that implied that whatever the exact
form a gift
was to take, it must have some element of public benefit.18

The commonly accepted classification of charitable purposes is
that found in Lord Macnaghten's speech in Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v. Pemsel:19
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for
the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts
for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial
to the community, not falling under any one of the preceding heads.

It will be observed that there is some ambiguity with respect to
the element of benefit to the community; it is not clear whether
that requirement is peculiar to the fourth category or whether it
Supra, footnote 1.
Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. c. 4.
18 Great Britain: Committee on the Law and Practice relating to
Charitable Trusts: Report 1952. Cmd. 8710. Para. 75. It is worth noting, in
view of what has been discussed earlier in this note, that the sentence immediately following the quoted passage in para. 75 reads "Trustees of a charitable
trust are trustees of a public trust, not a private trust."
19 [1891J A.C. 531, at p. 583.
16
17
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applies to all the categories. This doubt has been resolved in favour
of the latter interpretation. 20 Thus, although it may be that the
required degree of public benefit may vary according to the head of
charity under which a particular trust may fall, it is clear that a
charitable trust is, by definition, one which promotes the public
benefit. If the effect of malicious discrimination is to perpetuate
prejudice and to foster division among members of society, how can
it be said that a scheme with a built-in discriminatory element promotes the public benefit? Such provisions are designed to hurt not
to benefit and it is suggested that they cannot be included within
the scope of legal charity. In other words, a discriminatory charitable
trust is a contradiction in terms.
The second ground upon which maliciously discriminatory provisions may be attacked is that of public policy. It will be recalled
that this agreement was rejected by Buckley J. in In re Lysaght2'
but it is suggested that it should carry greater weight in Ontario.
The preamble to the Ontario Human Rights Code 22 provides, in part,
as follows:
it is public policy in Ontario that every person is free and equal in dignity
and rights without regard to race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry
or place of origin...
It could, of course, be argued that despite the broad scope of the
preamble the Code itself is limited to outlawing discrimination in
particular areas, of which the establishment of charitable trusts is not
one. On the other hand, the areas to which the Code particularly
applies 23 are all areas of public activity and it is submitted that a
charitable trust is at least as much in the public domain as is any
of the subjects covered by the Code.
A condition or provision against public policy may be defined
as one as to which the State has or may have an interest that it
should remain unperformed or unfulfilled. 24 It may be, as suggested
by Buckley J. in In re Lysaght25 that more must be shown than that
the provision under attack is undesirable or that it is widely regarded
as deplorable; 26 it is suggested that in the light of the preamble
20 See, e.g. In re Clompton, [19451 Ch. 12; Oppenheim,v. Tobacco Securities Trust Co., Ltd., [19513 A.C. 297. See also the Report of the Committee
on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts (supra, footnote 15),
para. 122: "It is well settled that the three specific and the fourth residual
head [in Lord 1Vacnaghten's classification in PemseZ] alike require benefit
to the community or a substantial section thereof."
21 Supra, footnote 1.
22 S.O.1961-62, c. 93.
23 They are the displaying of discriminatory notices or signs, the use of
accommodation, services or facilities available in any place to which the
public is customarily admitted, apartment leasing, employment and hiring
practices, and trade union membership.
24 See: Cooke v. Turner (1946), 15 M. & W. 727, 153 E.R. 1044.
25 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 402.
26 See Farewell v. Farewell (1892), 22 O.R. 573, per Boyd C., at p. 579:
"The Court . . . does not concern itself with the measure of commendation

or disapprobation which may attach to the proposed charitable schemes of
testators, provided only that they are not detrimental to the well-being of
society." (Emphasis added).
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to the Ontario Human Rights Code27 and of the present sensitive
state of relations between certain ethnic groups in Canada, that a
Canadian court should be much more receptive than was Buckley J.
to an attack against malicious discrimination, based on the ground
of public policy.
Assuming that a successful attack could be launched, from either
of the two grounds suggested supra, against maliciously discriminatory provisions in a charitable trust, two other questions remain to
be asked.
First, would the court be able merely to expunge the offensive
provisions and give effect to the rest of the trust or would it be
obliged to declare the whole gift invalid? It seems clear that this
issue turns on whether the discrimination was an essential element
of the settlor's core or paramount intention. It will be recalled that
Buckley J. in In re Lysaght28 was able to remove the offending words
and leave the rest of the gift intact by finding that the provisions
as to religious affiliation were merely peripheral and not central.
Similarly in Howard Savings Inst. v. Peep,29 where a bequest was
made to Amherst College to provide a scholarship fund for "American
born, Protestant, Gentile boys of good moral repute", the court was
able to remove the Protestant-Gentile limitation by an application
of cy pres. No doubt the court will usually be able to say that the
discriminatory provisions do not go to the root of the gift but there
may be cases where the settlor has made it plain that the discrimination is part of his paramount intention. For example, in La Fond
v. City of Detroit,30 where the settlor had given property to the city
to provide "a playfield for white children", the court was unable to
modify the trust by removing the colour limitation and held that
the trust failed completely, because the settlor had expressly provided that the terms of the gift were to be "carried out to the letter".
Thus it may be that if a settlor has worded his gift carefully
and has made it clear that the gift, if it takes effect at all, is to
take effect precisely as expressed, a court would have no option but
to declare the whole gift to be invalid. No one would be completely
Supra, footnote 22.
Supra, footnote 1.
29 (1961), 34 N.J. 494, 170 A. 2d 39. See also In re Dominion Students Hal
Trust: Dominion Students' Hall Trust v. A.G., [1947] Ch. 183, in which a
petition was brought to confirm a resolution passed at a meeting of the
charity that the memorandum of association be changed with respect to its
objects, so that it might be administered as a wider charity. The trust had
been set up several years before to provide a hostel for male students of
the overseas dominions of the British Empire. The hostel was restricted to
"dominion students of European origin", and thus excluded coloured students.
This was not a case of initial impossibility but Evershed J. was happy
to confirm the resolution and remove the colour bar. In the course of
27
28

his judgment, Evershed J. said, ".

.

. to retain the condition [as to ethnic

origin] so far from furthering the charity's main object, might defeat it
and would be liable to antagonize those students, both white and coloured,
whose support and goodwill it is the purpose of the charity to sustain."
(at p. 186).
(1959), 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W. 2d 530.
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happy to see such a refusal of a gift which could be used for public
purposes but if to use the fund otherwise than as directed would be
to commit certain violence upon the clear intention of the testator,
it is submitted that it is preferable to refuse the gift than to give
society's blessing to and confer substantial benefits upon a scheme
which can only be detrimental to the peaceful and reasonable ordering
of society.
One final issue should be raised. In In re Lysaght3' the question
of the discriminatory provisions only came before the court because
the Royal College of Surgeons was unwilling to accept the trust so
long as it contained those provisions. This suggests (and this also
appears to be the position in Ontario) that unless a trust containing
discriminatory provisions is challenged it will be allowed to take
effect. Such challenge may come from one of three places: from
the revenue department of government, which may be anxious to
have the charitable nature of a gift determined for taxation purposes; from the trustee who may be either too liberal or too public
relations conscious to be happy about accepting such a gift; or from
those who would take the property if the trust were to be declared
invalid. It is submitted that if the evil to be avoided is as great as
has been suggested in this note, this leaves too much to chance.
Machinery already exists for what is tantamount to the registration
of charitable gifts; 32 it is suggested that the machinery could be
adapted to permit the Public Trustee to initiate proceedings to test
the validity of all or part of any allegedly charitable trust which
contains maliciously discriminatory provisions. Only by the provision
of such a scheme could it be certain that society would not be called
upon to foster and support a trust which is designed to provoke dissension and perpetuate prejudice.
::

P. S. A. LA1EK_

Supra,footnote 1.
The Surrogate Courts Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 388, s. 72(10) provides that
notice of taking accounts shall be served upon the Public Trustee in the case
of all wills containing charitable gifts. It is understood that in practice copies
of all such wills are sent to the Public Trustee.
*Mr. Lamek, a graduate of Oxford University, is Associate Professor of
Law at the Osgoode Hall Law School.
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